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For it is argument, in particular argument about interpretations, that marks the distinctive mode of speech that characterizes college. What John Robert Seeley, Professor of Modem History, and one of the leaders of the late Victorian educational reform movement, said of history, in an introductory lecture to Cambridge college students in 1881, applies, mutatis mutandis, to other fields as well:
In history, everything depends upon turning narrative into problems .... Break the drowsy spell of narrative; ask yourself questions; set yourself problems; you will become an investigator; you will cease to be solemn and begin to be serious. (139)1 "Turn narrative into problems"-I know of no better imperative for college-level work, in distinction from secondary schooling. I should like to develop its implications for three areas of relevance to introducing: reading and writing, argument, and lying.
If an introductory course is an introduction to college-level work, this means, above all, that an introductory course is concerned with developing the students' capacities for reading, writing, and speaking--developing them in such a way that narrative is turned into problems. This leads to some general prescriptions. An introductory course must feature a good bit of activity. For example, there should be short weekly writing assignments on a set task that requires reflection, argumentation, and risk-taking. (The traditional term or research paper is wholly inappropriate to the introductory course). Written work should never be reportage ("mere narrative," in Seeley's term), but rather should require an appropriation of the material in a format in which there is never a "right answer." Mastery implies the capacity to "fool around." (Example: How would Levi-Strauss interpret a Budweiser Beer advertisement?) Each piece of writing must be rewritten at least once, regardless of grade, and this requires that every piece of writing be returned to the student, with useful comments, no later than the next class period. Collaborative work among groups of students should be encouraged, whether with respect to oral or written work, and an ethic of revision rather than originality should prevail. Among other devices, I ask my students to keep two notebooks, one for class and one for their reading. They are to make their notes on the right-hand pages and register queries, thoughts, conversations (with attribution) with other students, and, above all, revisionary proposals and rereadings on the left. At least once a quarter, I call in all students' notebooks and texts. After reading them through, I have individual conferences with each student to go over what they've written and underlined and to discuss with them what this implies as to how they are reading and reflecting. Please note, these sorts of pragmatic prescriptions raise a fundamental issue of professional responsibility. Bluntly put, we have as solemn an obligation to "keep up" with the literature and research in education and learning as we do in our particular fields of interest and research. No one should be permitted to teach an introductory course who is not conversant, among other matters, with the literature on the cognitive development of college-age individuals, with issues of critical reasoning and informal logic, and with research in reading and writing instruction. (This latter has, in the past two decades, become a separate and highly developed academic discipline).2 While there is surely art in teaching, it is, above all, a skilled profession.
Beyond anecdotal gossip about this or that teaching device with respect to writing, beyond the requirement of knowledge of serious research in the field, there are important theoretical issues that entail choices that must be made by any teacher of introductions.
There are, in fact, at least two distinct introductory tasks that we confront daily, regardless of field. The first is the introduction, the initiation, the enculturation of our students into the community of college as different from those other communities they know best, most particularly the communities of home and secondary school. The former difference we tend to address largely through the extra-curriculum, ranging from residence halls (in some institutions) to a planned diversity of admissions and student services (in most). Curricularly, we address difference from home only obliquely, by challenging notions of authority, by instilling an ethic of everything (at least in principle) being open to public suspicion and question. By largely confining the contrast of college and home to the extra-curriculum, the faculty has allowed itself to remain officially unconscious of this most central, and often most painful, process of enculturation.
The second introduction, the initiation into the difference between the intellectual community of high school and college, is seen chiefly as a matter of general education-more recently, as the responsibility of programs in generic skills such as writing and critical reasoning. However, there is latent in such a conception of the tasks of general educa-tion a set of issues that have yet to be addressed widely by the educational community and that require consideration of a third, distinct and more traditional, educational task: the initiation into a disciplinary community as separate from the community of college.
Whether Reflecting on these examples has any number of educational implications for curriculum development in upper-level courses. It may well be the particular knowledge-communities (as institutionalized, in most places, in the departmental majors) that ought to take primary responsibility for college-level writing instruction rather than freshman programs in generic, expository writing aimed at an imagined abstract and universalized audience. Conversely, reflecting on such examples may lead to the conclusion that other modes of writing-especially more reflexive or playful styles and genres--ought to be to the fore in general education courses and in those introductory courses that are thought of as being particularly appropriate to the task of enculturating the student into the academy at large, as opposed to the introductory courses that aim to enculturate the student into the several disciplines and knowledge communities. The question of writing is but a variant of the basic educational decision: What does the introductory course introduce?
Closely related to the above-and my second reflection on the injunction to "turn narrative into problems"-is the role of argumentation, especially argument about interpretations. For me, this question entails two other propositions, both social in nature. The first is that a central goal of liberal learning is the acceptance of (and training in) the requirement to bring private percept into public discourse and, therefore, the requirement to learn to negotiate difference with civility. It is this requirement that, in our culture, makes religion a useful subject for an introductory course to the community of college and to college-level work. The second is the insistence that argument exists for the purpose of clariying choices and that choices are always consequential, that is to say, they require the acceptance of responsibility. I emphasize the first proposition to counter the adolescent caricature that argument is what occurs at home around the dining room table when everyone shouts and no one listens. Conclusion: keeping one's thoughts to oneself is the wisest well as with alternative interpretations cited in the note. It is a paradigmatic view of reading, and an understanding of argument which privileges the conflict of interpretations. The "scientific" format of citation was first developed for legal and parliamentary writing. It provides authority by citing precedents, by locating the author's intellectual pedigree. A citation such as "(Levi-Strauss, 1964-71)" does not invite pausing and interpretative activity. It associates the author's opinion, in the mind of the reader, with a position adumbrated by a recognized authority-with no expectation that the relevant passage will actually be ferreted out by the reader from a four-volume work of some 1600 difficult pages. It is a syntagmatic view of reading which privileges genealogy. A decision by an author (let alone an editor) as to the format of referencing and citation will produce fundamentally different texts, even if the words remain the same, which presuppose different sorts of knowledge and capacities on the part of the reader and which articulate different visions of "what counts" as persuasive. strategy; privacy is protective coloration that leads to some ethic of immature toleration; "let everyone do their own thing." I emphasize the second proposition to counter the caricature often denoted in political and parental discourse by the improper label, "relativism," the notion that there is "always another point of view" and that, therefore, decisions can be seen either as provisional and irrational or as being endlessly put off until certainty obtains.
Attention to matters of choice and responsibility ought to begin on the first day of class with a discussion of that most primary text, the course syllabus-a disclosure of the choices made as to its order, the kinds and format of the data, the relationship among the topics, the relative time spent on each item; a discussion of the options considered and rejected as well as the reasons why; an attempt to account for the intended intellectual benefits and costs of the various decisions. That is to say, I want to use the syllabus as the first occasion for reflecting aloud on choices and consequences. I want to impeach the apparent self-evidence of the syllabus and make plain its status as a constructed argument. For this reason, textbooks ought never to be used in introductory courses, and anthologies, but sparingly. They shift constructive responsibility away from teacher and class to an external, all but omniscient, narrator and authority. It is important that moments of reprise be scheduled throughout the course, moments of reflection on the relative adequacy of the choices made as well as time available for the entertainment of revisionary proposals once students are more "in the know."
For example, my year-long introductory course, "Religion in Western Civilization," is organized around a single question that represents an argumentative definition of 'civilization': "What is tradition?" "How are traditions maintained, through change, by acts of reinterpretation?" This issue is made concrete and consequential, on the very first day, by reference to the current political debates over the Constitution and the Supreme Court. That is to say, there is nothing innocent about a definition of 'tradition' or 'civilization' as a contested construct rather than a stable deposit. Students have strong feelings about the question (when put in this way) and a stake in its answer-the notion of a stake being the proper sense in which a matter is "interesting." Ventilating this, and encouraging students to commit themselves publicly, sets up opinions to be tested, reformed, and revised into arguments throughout the course. The same sort of discussion is invited by the decision to begin the study of the "West" with the Ancient Near East rather than with Greece. What are the implications and consequences of constructing the political history of the "West" as essentially monarchic rather than of the case that the Court ignored; likewise, the students, having read the case that describes a familiar rather than an exotic religious activity, discover new implications in Durkheim's position.
The third aspect of the injunction, "turn narrative into problems," is the most reflexive of all, for it concerns how we, as teachers, problematize our classroom narratives. That is to say, it concerns our habit of "white" lying in introductory courses-I know there are happier euphemisms such as "simplification"-when we persistently disguise what is problematic in our work. For example, we traditionally screen from our students the hard work that results in the editorial production of exemplary texts. Despite what we know, we treat them as "found objects," reading them with our students as if each word were directly revelatory. Moreover, we conceal from our students the time-bound conditional judgments that make the objects exemplary, and we ignore their revisionary histories. We display texts as if they were self-evidently meaningful and significant and allow our students to feel guilty or dumb if they do not immediately share this perception. That is to say, we convey to our students a specious perfection of the object studied, a specious ease to the processes of reading, and a specious necessity to the history of that object. Think of the educational consequences. If we present a theoretical work as perfect, as having no revisionary history, then we present a work that no student can hope to emulate. Of more gravity, if we present an exemplary text without its attendant reception-history, we appear to reduce its evaluation to the vagaries of taste or, more recently, to the politics of self-interest. In either case, in the name of simplification we have mystified the object.
Similarly, in the name of simplification, we lie by treating theories as if they were facts. We treat difficult, complex, controversial theoretical entities as if they were self-evident constituents of the universe we inhabit. Students coming out of introductory courses in the Humanities know that there is such a "thing" as an author's intention, and they regularly and effortlessly recover it from whatever text passes into view. Students in introductory courses in the Social Sciences know that there is such a "thing" as a society that functions, and they effortlessly and regularly claim to observe it doing so. Students in introductory courses in the Natural Sciences are soon wedded to what Nietzsche called "the myth of the immaculate perception," and regularly, effortlessly, and without embarrassment gaze at "naked facts." Despite the oft-repeated claim that, in our introductory courses, we teach the "how" rather than the "what" of a given field, we do not. When I read my students' texts with them in conference, it is always the theoretical punch-line that they've underlined, never anything of the process that led to its formulation. That is to say, theoretical proposals are being reduced to naked facts. Discussion often takes the format of "show and tell," with students displaying to one another these now unproblematic and self-evident conclusions. We have successfully concealed from our students the methodological force of Carl Friedrich Gauss's remark, "I have my results, I do not yet know how I am to arrive at them." This ignorance of process (as different from conclusion) is buttressed by a false generosity with respect to matters of method and theory, presenting this method or theory in summary one week, that method or theory the next. None of them is allowed to have the kind of monomaniacal imperialist power a good theory or method displays. Lacking this force, theories and methods have been reduced to gossip, to mere opinions, without entailments or consequences. Again, in the name of simplification we have encouraged mystification.
The point of the above is to insist on an ethic that students be "in the know. " If the purpose of an introductory course is to introduce students to college-level work, then a part of that task consists in introducing the students to the academy's ethos of disclosure. The problem is not one of difficulty; it is one of time. We need to decrease coverage in order to allow for frequent structured pauses in which our narrative becomes problematic. To take only the first issue raised above, that of the concealment of the editorial work that produces exemplary texts, ten pages of reading, a one-page handout of translated material, twenty minutes of homework, and twenty minutes of class time is sufficient to allow my students to debate and vote on a set of carefully chosen "variant readings" in the New Testament, giving them some sense of how a text is constructed by acts of scholarly judgement. Experienced once, this exercise needs only to be alluded to again with each new text encountered.8
Permit me three concluding observations. To the degree that an introductory course serves as an introduction to college-level work, the proper context for its discussion and evaluation is not the department. One might wish for the creation of a regular, college-wide forum where everyone involved in the teaching of introductory courses, regardless of their putative subject matters, might gather to discuss their common pedagogical problems and resources. To the degree that an introductory course serves as an introduction to college-level work in a particular community of discourse, one would expect that one's colleagues would have detailed knowledge of what has been introduced and would build, explicitly, on it in subsequent courses.
For myself, I know of no more interesting educational exercise than meeting, two or three years later, for an evening, with small groups of students from my introductory courses, to reread and discuss one text from the introduction and to reread and discuss their first papers on that text. By and large, our current grading systems give no means by which a student might gauge whether he or she has gained "depth." We need scheduled moments of reprise, formalized moments of return during a four year course of study, so that students can see for themselves the distance they have traveled, the mastery they have acquired. To this end, I am much taken with experiments such as student portfolios of their four years work coupled with "exit interviews" to review them, or senior seminars which reread texts.
All that we do is in service of what is, for me, the chief goal of a liberal arts education: the empowering of a student so that she or he gains possession of an intellectual autobiography. This sort of mastery requires a trained self-consciousness, the acquisition of skills in public discourse, the capacity to negotiate complex materials, and occasions for representing one's ownership in focused products. Above all, it requires an educational environment in which students are "in the know" in every possible respect. The introductory course, as it works on turning narrative into problems, is a first chapter in this endeavor.
